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It is well known that Maimonides rejects the Kalam argument for the exist-
ence of God because it assumes the temporal creation of the world, a premise
for which he says there is no “cogent demonstration (burhan qat ^ i) except
among those who do not know the difference between demonstration, dia-
lectics, and sophistic argument.”1 By contrast, he claims to establish belief in
the existence of God “through a demonstrative method as to which there is
no disagreement in any respect” (I:71:182). Taken at his word, Maimonides’
proofs for the existence of the deity, like Aquinas’s five ways, have tradition-
ally been read as models of medieval natural theology: of the power of human
reason to independently establish revealed truth. In recent years, however,
the same demonstrations have assumed a second kind of significance. For
scholars, like myself, who argue that Maimonides holds severe views about
the limitations of human knowledge of divine science and metaphysics, these
demonstrations are the strongest conceivable counterevidence.2 If Mai-
monides really held that humans cannot apprehend metaphysical truths
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1. Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1963), I:71:180. All references are to this translation;
parenthetic in-text references are to part, chapter, and page.
2. The locus classicus for this view is Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of
Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides,” in Studies
in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. I Twersky, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1979), I:82–109. See also his “Les Limites de la Métaphysique selon
Al-Farabi, ibn Bajja et Maimonide; Sources et Antitheses de ces Doctrines chez
Alexandre d’Aphrodise et Chez Themistius,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13 (1981):
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about the deity, how could he have demonstrated (or even thought he could
demonstrate) the existence of God? If he does demonstrate it, then humans
evidently do have knowledge of metaphysics. As one distinguished scholar
has recently protested, it is nothing less than “perverse” to interpret Mai-
monides as “meaning that the existence of God is unknowable when he in
fact prides himself on having demonstrated the existence of God in four
different ways.”3
One might, of course, try to argue that Maimonides does not demon-
strate the existence of God in any sense of the term ‘demonstrate’; but I
shall not. In some sense of the term, he surely does. And that he uses the
term ‘demonstration’ (burhan) in multiple, stronger and weaker, senses was
already recognized by Maimonides’ medieval readers. Thus Samuel ibn
Tibbon, the thirteenth-century translator of Maimonides’ Guide of the Per-
plexed from Arabic to Hebrew, translates ‘burhan’ by ‘mofet’, and ‘dalil’ (the
Arabic term Maimonides uses for a weaker kind of proof or indication) by
‘re’ayah’. However, in the glossary (Peirush ha-Millot ha-Zarot) he appended
to his translation, he writes:
The proofs [ra’ayot] about things are of two types: strong proof about
whose truth there is no doubt and proof lower than it with respect to
its truth. I reserved the name ‘mofet’ (demonstration) for the strong
proof . . . and the other I gave the generic name ‘re’ayah’. But some-
times the second kind of [weaker] proof is called ‘mofet’ (demonstra-
tion) by way of transfer (ha-’ayarah) or extension (harhavah).4
211–25; “Dieu et L’Etre Selon Maimonide: Exégese d’Exode 3,14 et doctrine con-
nexe,” in Celui qui est: Interprétations juives et chrétiennes d’Exode 3, 14, ed. A. de Libera
et E. Zum Brunn (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf [Collection “Patrimoines”], 1986),
15–24; and “The Relation between Maimonides’ Halakhic and non-Halakhic
Works,” in Maimonides and Philosophy, ed., S. Pines and Y. Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1987). Pines concludes, on the basis of the limitations of the intellect with
respect to knowledge of metaphysics, that Maimonides, like Kant, gives priority to
the practical over the theoretical. For arguments drawing different ‘skeptical’
conclusions, see my “Maimonides in the Skeptical Tradition,” ms.; “Maimonides on
the Growth of Knowledge and the Limitations of the Intellect,” to appear in Tony
Levy, ed., Maimonide: Traditions philosophiques et scientifiques médievales arabe, hébraique,
latine; “Logical Syntax as a Key to a Secret of the Guide of the Perplexed,” (in Heb.),
Iyyun 38 (1989): 137–66; “Maimonides on Language and the Science of Language,”
in Maimonides and the Sciences, ed., H. Levine and R. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
2000), pp. 173–226; and The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (forthcoming).
3. Herbert A. Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” Mai-
monidean Studies 3 (1992–1993): 49–103, 86. See also Alfred L. Ivry, “The Logical
and Scientific Premises of Maimonides’ Thought,” in Perspectives on Jewish Thought
and Mysticism, ed. Alfred L. Ivry, Elliot R. Wolfson, and Allan Arkush (Amsterdam:
Harwood Publishers, 1998), pp. 63–97, 70.
4. Perush Ha-Millot HaZarot, ed. Y. Even-Shemuel, Sefer Moreh HaNevukhim (Je-
rusalem: 1987).
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So, close attention to Maimonides’ choice of terms is as always essential, but
it will not resolve all ambiguities; we must also look carefully at the substan-
tive arguments in their contexts. In so doing, we find that what distinguishes
the weaker proofs, or demonstrations, is that they do not yield conclusions
that count as the content of knowledge in the strong sense that the dog-
matic philosopher, the philosopher who believes that it is possible to have
metaphysical knowledge, requires in order to achieve the state of intellec-
tual perfection which is either to be identified with or leads to conjunction,
or union, with the Active Intellect. Furthermore, I also argue, Maimonides’
own demonstrations of the existence of God (and here I shall concentrate
on the third of Maimonides’ proofs) are of this weaker type. So, while it is
indeed possible to demonstrate (in the weaker sense) the existence of God,
the product of the demonstration does not constitute metaphysical knowl-
edge of the strong kind relevant to conjunction with the Active Intellect and
thereby to individual intellectual perfection.
Before turning to these arguments, let me emphasize that in distin-
guishing a weaker sense of ‘demonstration,’ I do not mean to suggest that
it is unimportant, or that it is important only for political reasons, or that it
is important only insofar as the community at large believes that we can
demonstrate the existence of God (whereas the philosopher knows better).
On the contrary, I believe that Maimonides’ demonstrations are central to
his philosophical project in the Guide. This project does not primarily aim at
the establishment of doctrines or beliefs, either with apodeictic certainty or
even with nearly conclusive evidence (even where such near certainty is
possible). Instead it is primarily concerned with practices that constitute a
way of living, although intellectual inquiry on theoretical topics is among
the most important of these. Maimonides’ demonstrations are, I argue,
fundamental to the Guide not because of the epistemic pedigree of their
products but because of the intellectual exercises in which they engage the
demonstrator.
I
In II:1 of the Guide, Maimonides sets out four “speculations” concerning the
existence of the deity. One question that should immediately strike the
reader is, Why four (although we know from II:10, that the number four holds
great fascination for Maimonides)? Maimonides’ exposition does not sug-
gest that he thought that any one of the proofs was better or more certain
than another, or that they progress, say, in their degree of certainty. So, unless
he was engaged in cataloguing the available demonstrations in the literature,
why would one demonstration not suffice? And if he not simply enumerating
four proofs, is there a structure to their presentation and order?
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To make matters more puzzling, the combination of the first and third
proofs also constitutes an odd pairing. The first proof argues from the facts
of physical motion, based on fairly detailed principles of physics, to the
existence of a first incorporeal mover.5 Because it is based on principles of
physics, this first demonstration is generally considered a physical proof.
The third proof, on the other hand, does not depend on any physical
principles (although it depends on one physical, or sensible, datum). It
reasons from various premises based solely on the notion of existence, or
being, and on the modalities of possibility and necessity. Maimonides’
medieval commentators (such as Efodi) already saw that the proof is a
version of Avicenna’s metaphysical proof for the existence of a being nec-
essarily existent in virtue of itself. (We shall return to this interpretation,
which has been recently challenged by Herbert Davidson.) However,
Avicenna presented his metaphysical proof precisely because he believed
that the physical proof is inadequate: that it only proves the existence of a
first mover of the motion of the corporeal world. His metaphysical proof
was meant to prove the existence of a deity who is the cause of the incorpo-
real as well as corporeal worlds and who is the cause of its existence and not
merely motion. Hence, Avicenna argued that his own proof is more certain,
noble, and general than the physical one. In reply, Averroes criticized the
notions of possibility and necessity underlying Avicenna’s proof and de-
fended the proof from motion as the only valid proof for the existence of
the deity.6 Whichever view we follow, it should be clear that the first and
third proofs were regarded as rivals. Why, then, does Maimonides present
both? Indeed how can he?
The second and fourth speculations also seem to divide along the same
physical/metaphysical line. The second proof, from so-called logical sym-
metry, argues that just as there is a last thing that is moved and does not
move, so there must be a first mover that is not itself moved. This argument,
like the first, is based on motion; hence, it is a physical proof. The fourth
speculation, which Maimonides explicitly calls “like [the third,] philo-
sophic,” argues from three premises, (1) the fact that we “constantly see”
things pass from potentiality to actuality, (2) the principle that all actualiza-
tions of potentiality require a cause, and (3) the impossibility of infinite
series of causes, to the conclusion that there must be “something that causes
5. Throughout this paper, and despite disagreements, I am much indebted to
the seminal work of Herbert Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the Existence
of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987). On the first proof, see also Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Com-
mandment, Physics, and Doubt,” in Hazon Nahum: Studies in Jewish Law, Thought, and
History presented to Dr. Norman Lamm, ed. Y. Elman and J. S. Gurock (New York:
Yeshiva University Press, 1997), pp. 149–62.
6. As Davidson shows, one issue here is whether proofs of the existence of a
being fall within the scope of a science to whose subject matter the being is
supposed to belong.
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the passage from potentiality to actuality, that is perpetually existent in one
and the same state, and in which there is no potentiality at all.”7 And
because this first purely actual thing lacks all potentiality, it cannot be
possible in itself and actualized through a cause; rather it must “exist in
virtue of its essence.” Now, like the first proof for a first mover, this argu-
ment prima facie rests on the impossibility of an infinite series of causes. At
first sight, one would also think that the passages from potentiality to
actuality concern specific physical motions. In that case, the argument
would demonstrate a first source of motion, and indeed Aristotle’s own
introduction of this form of argument in the Metaphysics (II, 2) presents it
in this light. However, a closer look shows that Maimonides does not present
the argument as a proof of a first source of motion, but rather as a proof of
a first cause of existence. He argues that if each cause in the series (and
therefore the first one) has potentiality or, as he shifts to say, possibility in
its essence, then (because every possibility must be realized at some time)
it “would at some time become nonexistent.” And insofar as it is non-exis-
tent (at some time), it clearly cannot cause something else only potentially
existent (at that time) to become actually existent. Indeed it would require
a cause for its own existence. But by the same reasoning, if the latter cause
contains potentiality (or possibility) in its essence, it also requires a cause,
quickly drawing us into an infinite series of causes. Now, the problem with
such a series is not, or not simply, the impossibility of an infinite series per
se. Instead, as Maimonides makes clear in I:69, the sister chapter to these
speculations, for any series of causes and effects, it is only the first cause in
the series that is “in true reality the efficient cause of all [the] intermediar-
ies” (I:69:168) and, hence, of the final term in the series. All the intermedi-
ate causes merely mediate, or communicate, the causal power that
exclusively rests in the ultimate cause. Hence, if there is no first cause, there
is no cause, period. The problem, then, with the infinite series of causes that
would result if each member had (some) possibility in its essence (and
would therefore require yet another cause to actualize its existence) is that
such a series would lack an ultimate, or first, element, hence, a cause of
existence. Thus this fourth argument demonstrates the existence of the
perpetually existent deity that is necessary in itself as the first cause of
existence and, like the third proof, it is metaphysical.8
The four proofs, in sum, fall into two clearly divided categories: the first
two are physical, the second pair metaphysical. Furthermore, within each
pair, Maimonides cites the second member to improve upon, or to pick up
slack left by, the first member. Let me briefly illustrate this with respect to
the pair of physical proofs. (I will return to the corresponding relation
7. Cf. Metaphysics IX, 8, 1049b; XII 6–7, 1071b–1072b for Aristotle’s own proof
from potentiality to actuality, possibly the source of this argument.
8. That the fourth proof is related to the third is also noted by Warren Zev
Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1998),
p. 74.
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between the third and fourth speculations later.) The first demonstration
proves the existence of a first mover but it only shows that the first mover is
one, or contains no internal multiplicity, insofar as it is numerically one of
its kind. In other words, if the first mover is merely one of (even if it is the
first in) a class of movers, it would not be free of all multiplicity. Only the
second proof further shows that the first mover is ‘indivisible’, simple, or
internally one in the strong sense that it contains only one notion. Mai-
monides alludes to this qualification on the first proof when he says that it
is absurd that there should be multiplicity in nonmaterial (and therefore
strictly speaking nonindividuatable) things “except when one of them is a
cause and the other an effect”—for then each such being will “be endowed”
with two “separately conceivable things” (II:4:259), one it shares with other
nonmaterial things and one that distinguishes it from them. Now, this turns
out to be exactly how the movers of the spheres, including the first mover of
the outermost sphere, are distinguished from one another once different
incorporeal intellects are posited as the respective movers of each of the
spheres (as Maimonides does in II:4). Therefore, even if we identify the
incorporeal mover demonstrated in the first proof with the first of the
multiple incorporeal movers that Maimonides later posits, it turns out to be
internally multiple. The second demonstration attempts to pick up this
slack by arguing that for any being “endowed with two separately conceiv-
able things,” or notions, if one of them exists separately, so must the other.
It follows that the unmoved mover is, by hypothesis, not composed of two
separately conceivable things, hence, it is indivisible or internally simple.
The second proof thereby completes the demonstration of the deity’s unity.
Along these lines, we can explain the relation between the members of
each pair of physical and metaphysical proofs. But why the two rival pairs of
proofs? Despite the physical/metaphysical difference among them, each
has a common structure to which Maimonides may be trying to draw our
attention by combining them in one chapter. This structure is, to begin
with, that of a demonstration which, among the various types of syllogistic
arguments, is distinguished from the others (for example, dialectical argu-
ments) by its premises.9 According to Aristotle, the premises of demonstra-
9. For an additional problem that would seem to throw into question all of
Maimonides’ demonstrations of the existence of God, see Marvin Fox, Interpreting
Maimonides (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 71–72. According to
Fox, Maimonides “differs from [the classical, i.e., Aristotelian] tradition” in his
treatment of singular propositions (propositions containing singular terms whose
subjects are single individuals); and the demonstrations of God’s existence all
involve singular propositions. Fox notes that throughout “the history of logic, from
the time of Aristotle on, singular propositions have been a source of trouble
because they do not seem to fit precisely into any of the established classifications,”
i.e., as universal or particular propositions. Therefore different logicians have
assimilated them to the syllogistic in different ways, for example, among the Arabic
Aristotelians, Al-Farabi treats them as particular and Avicenna as universal proposi-
tions. However, Maimonides, Fox says,
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tions are (1) certainly and/or necessarily true, (2) primary and nondemon-
strable (such as, definitions), (3) immediate, (4) better known than and
prior to the conclusions that follow from them, and (5) the “causes” of their
conclusions. In contrast, the premises of, for example, dialectical argu-
ments are not true, certain, or necessary, but merely generally accepted
opinions (endoxa). In his Treatise on the Art of Logic, Maimonides follows this
Aristotelian typology, and cites examples, but does not attempt to be com-
prehensive. He distinguishes the premises of demonstrative syllogisms from
those of dialectical syllogisms as those that consist in perceptual judgments
goes his own way, taking an independent stand for which there is no
clear precedent. He distinguishes singular propositions from all other
types and makes a special point of not assimilating them to any other
form of proposition. He tells us nothing at all, however, about how to
integrate these propositions into the standard system of logic.
Since the Guide inevitably contains many discussions using the singular term
‘God,’ “we face difficult problems of interpretation if we do not have a proper
logical understanding of how to classify and deal with singular propositions” (p.72).
Thus, according to Fox, Maimonides deliberately but covertly throws all metaphysi-
cal propositions about the deity into question.
Notice, to begin with, that in the context in which he raises this issue Fox is
countering Leo Strauss’s views concerning Maimonides’ use of deliberate contra-
dictions; but if Fox’s point is correct, its ramifications are much more radical than
any of Strauss’s esoteric theses: the interpretation of virtually all substantive meta-
physical claims in the Guide is thrown into question, whatever that would mean. In
fact, however, I do not believe that Fox has raised a real difficulty. He is correct to
remind us that singular propositions have been a source of endless debate among
Aristotelians and Aristotle scholars in part because Aristotle generally discusses
universal and particular propositions rather than singular ones (which he never
gives as examples of premises of valid inferences). However, it is not true that
Aristotle never discusses singular propositions, and there are various explanations
for his failure to include them in his systematic discussions of syllogistic form. These
range from W. D. Ross’s suggestion that Aristotle is primarily concerned with
science and science is not concerned with individual objects (or, for that matter,
with terms of the highest generality, categories, which are also not discussed), to
Lukasiewicz’s proposal that Aristotle only discusses terms that can occur both as
subject and as predicate in the figures (which excludes singular terms), to Patzig’s
detailed claims that Aristotle only explicitly deals with expressions that satisfy the
axioms of a particular theory of relations among terms, axioms that singular terms
do not satisfy. But whatever explanation one accepts for Aristotle’s omission of
singular terms from his explicit discussion, it is agreed by everyone that there must
be a way to include singular terms within the overall theory, either by subsuming
them under universal propositions or under particular propositions or under some
hybrid of the two. No one to my knowledge thinks either that singular propositions
cannot ultimately be explained and, therefore, cannot be used in reasoning or, what
would seem to be an equally reasonable conclusion to draw, that we should reject
the syllogistic because it fails to account for singular terms.
Furthermore, it is misleading to suggest, as Fox does, that Maimonides “goes
his own way, taking an independent stand for which there is no clear precedent.”
Maimonides begins chap. two of the Millot Ha-higayon, his Treatise on the Art of Logic,
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or first intelligibles rather than generally accepted opinions.10 But he adds:
“Know that there are conditions of the demonstrative syllogism which
cannot be discussed in this treatise.”11
Now, the difference between demonstrative and nondemonstrative
(dialectical) premises is said to make the difference for Aristotle between
scientific and nonscientific knowledge. However, recent commentators on
Aristotle have argued that, notwithstanding his official stance that only
demonstrative arguments lead to scientific knowledge, in Aristotle’s actual
scientific practice dialectical argument is more central than demonstration.
This in turn suggests that higher cognitive status should be given to dialec-
tical syllogisms than Aristotle’s explicit statements would imply. Following
the lead of the Aristotle scholars, several Maimonides scholars such as
Arthur Hyman and Joel Kraemer have also argued that Maimonides places
with an example of affirmative and negative singular propositions; goes on to
discuss and classify universal and particular propositions, some definite, others
indefinite, some affirmative, others negative; and then adds: “When, however, the
subject of a proposition is a single individual, e.g., ‘Zayd is an animal,’ ‘Amr writes,’
‘Bekr is wise,’ we call it a singular proposition.” At the conclusion of the chapter, he
summarizes the six kinds of propositions, including among them “the singular
which may be likewise affirmative or negative” (Maimonides, Treatise on the Art of
Logic, ed. I. Efros, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 34 (1966):
chap. II, p. 36). Such a straightforward presentation would suggest that, while
Maimonides does not commit himself to a particular treatment of singular terms
and does not elaborate on how he would incorporate them into his logic, he saw
nothing especially problematic about them. His silence need not hint at a secret or
be taken as evidence of “an independent stand for which there is no clear prece-
dent.” One need only compare Maimonides’ Treatise to other works in logic written
by his contemporaries to know that, for all its riches, it is far from comprehensive.
Indeed in at least one other context, Maimonides refers to additional conditions on
the syllogistic which “cannot be discussed in this treatise” (chap. VIII, p. 49).
Finally, in support of his position, Fox notes the editor Israel Efros’s “wisdom”
in observing that “the significance of [the Treatise] lies not in where it agrees . . . but
where it shows discrimination in daring to disagree.” Yet, in his Introduction, Efros
himself cites A1-Ghazali’s statement in his Intentions of the Philosophers (with which
Maimonides was almost certainly familiar) that science does not concern itself with
individuals which is reason enough not to elaborate on them in a logic; he adds
that, while “the impression is that [Maimonides] regards [the singular proposition]
as a class in itself,” his position is not unique but “in agreement with an anonymous
work contained in Thomas, Opusc. 44, Summa Totius Logicae, De Interp. c. 6” (23).
Neither of these observations would suggest a hidden agenda or anything deeply
problematic about Maimonides’ view of singular statements about God. Indeed,
contra Fox, the case of singular propositions is not an instance where “Maimonides
does not follow an established school” (p. 72 n.10).
10. See Maimonides’ Treatise on the Art of Logic, chap. VIII, p.48. For a valuable
survey of these issues, see Arthur Hyman, “Demonstrative, Dialectical, and Sophis-
tic Arguments in the Philosophy of Moses Maimonides,” in Moses Maimonides and
His Time, ed. E. Ormsby (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
1989).
11. Hyman, “Demonstrative, Dialectical, and Sophistic Arguments,” p. 49.
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more weight on and gives higher cognitive value to (Aristotelian as opposed
to Kalamic) dialectical arguments than we have been accustomed to
think.12 Hence, they argue, even if we cannot demonstrate metaphysical
propositions, we can have knowledge, dialectical knowledge, of them. I will not
enter this discussion here. Suffice it to say that even if Maimonides gives
Aristotelian dialectical argument an important cognitive role in science,
dialectic cannot do the work genuine demonstration does: namely, yield the
kind of apprehension appropriate to union or conjunction with the Active
Intellect, hence, the caliber of metaphysical knowledge that the dogmatist
requires.
One feature shared by all four of Maimonides’ “speculations” is, then,
their demonstrative character. But this is not all. Rather than focus on the
criteria of certainty and necessity for demonstrative premises, I now want to
focus our attention on the last condition: that the premises of a demonstra-
tive syllogism furnish the cause of the conclusion. Recall, first, that what
Aristotle and, following him, Maimonides mean by a ‘cause’ is not, as we
post-Humeans think, a prior event that brings about its later effect. Rather
an Aristotelian cause (of any of the four kinds) is an explanatory factor, an
answer to a why-question, the clause that follows the connective ‘because’
in statements of the form ‘P because Q.’13 Another way to put the condition
in question is that in order to have demonstrative scientific knowledge of
something, knowledge that consists in a grasp of the demonstrative syllo-
gism whose conclusion is that thing, one must know its cause because
knowledge requires understanding and “we only understand when we know
the explanation,” that is, the cause (Post An. I.2, 70b:30–1). Given Aristotle’s
additional view that scientific knowledge is deductive (i.e., syllogistic), and
the principle that knowledge of something requires apprehension of its
cause, these conditions come together in the claim that the premises of a
demonstration or, more precisely, its middle term must provide the cause,
or explanation, of the conclusion.
Now, full-fledged demonstrations of this kind, demonstrations that
furnish a cause, or explanation, of the conclusion by way of their middle
term, both establish the fact that and explain why the conclusion is true. In
Aristotle’s language, they are “demonstrations of the reason why” (to dioti);
in scholastic teminology, they are demonstrations propter quid. In contrast,
syllogistic deductions that argue from effects to the existence of possible
causes merely establish that the conclusion is true, knowledge of the fact (to
12. Hyman, “Demonstrative, Dialectical, and Sophistic Arguments”; Joel L.
Kraemer, “Maimonides on Aristotle and Scientific Method,” in Moses Maimonides
and His Time; Kraemer, “Maimonides’ Use of (Aristotelian) Dialectic,” in Mai-
monides and the Sciences, pp. 111–130. Although he does not put it in exactly these
terms, see also Ivry, “The Logical and Scientific Premises.”
13. See Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s
Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980).
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hoti), not why it is. Deductions of this kind are, in scholastic terminology,
demonstrations quia (“demonstrations of the fact”).14
This distinction was developed in various directions by Aristotle’s suc-
cessors. Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, makes a causally prior
component a strict condition on demonstration: “there is no demonstration
through what is posterior.”15 The distinction was also familiar within Arabic
Aristotelianism. Most important for our purposes, Avicenna, like Alexander,
emphasizes the causal condition on a demonstration (burhan) when he
constructs his own argument for the existence of the being necessarily
existent in itself. This being, he says, is “free from causes, it has no genus or
differentia or definition, and there is no demonstration of it, but it is the
demonstration of all things.”16 Instead of a demonstration, Avicenna says
that we can give a ‘proof’ (dalil) or indication of the existence of this being,
that is, a syllogism in which the middle term is an effect rather than a cause
of the conclusion. In particular, we can argue from the actual existence of
possibly existent beings to the existence of the being necessarily existent in
itself, even though the former is an effect, not the cause, of the latter. But
this is just a proof, not a demonstration, for Avicenna.
Not all philosophers within the medieval Aristotelian tradition took
this line. Most famously, Aquinas argues at length in the Summa Theologica
I.2.2 that, while we cannot demonstrate the existence of God through the
cause, or propter quid, we can demonstrate His existence through its effects
(quia). Suppose to the contrary that Anselm’s ontological argument were
valid and God’s essence was that of the being than which no greater can be
conceived to exist; then the ontological argument would be a demonstra-
tion propter quid of God’s existence. But, Aquinas counters, humans cannot
know God’s essence. Only God Himself could have the knowledge that is
necessary for a demonstration propter quid of His own existence.17 Instead
14. See Aristotle, Post. An. I, 13, 78b22–79a15; for a thorough review of the
history of the general distinction through the Renaissance, see W. A. Wallace,
Causality and Scientific Explanation, 2 vols. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1972), vol. 1; on the sixteenth-century uses, see, P. Barker and B. R. Goldstein,
“Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal,”
Perspectives on Science (1998): 232–58.
15. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1, trans. W. E. Dooley,
S.J. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 13:30, 34; for further discussion,
see Pines, “Translator’s Introduction,” p. 1xixf., and Davidson, Proofs, pp. 298–99
and references therein. A classic source is Liber de Causis, trans. Dennis J. Brand
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984), V:57–63, 24–25.
16. ‘Uyun al-masa’il, ed. M. Cruz Hernandez; repr. and trans. in George
Hourani, “Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence,” Philosophical Forum IV
(1972): 76. On Avicenna’s position in this regard, see also Davidson, Proofs, p. 298–99,
and D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1988), pp. 316–18.
17. For independent reasons, to be sure, God neither needs to demonstrate
His own existence propter quid (He knows of His own existence directly) nor could
He, if such a proof requires a stretch of discourse and He has no discursively
definable essence. (I am indebted here to an anonymous referee.)
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we humans can know God (only) through His effects, that is, the natural
world; hence we can demonstrate His existence (only) quia. These effects
are metaphysically posterior to their cause, but they are epistemically more
accessible and prior for us, better known to us, and therefore can ground a
certain kind of certainty. In other words, demonstrations quia, from the
effect, admittedly establish that something is the case without establishing
why, without providing a theoretically deep explanation in the way that a
demonstration propter quid would. Yet Aquinas insists that they are demon-
strations: they yield knowledge that is weaker than what is furnished by the
highest demonstrations but it is none the less rationally certain.
Now, given these two competing positions on syllogistic arguments
from effects, Avicenna’s which denies them the status of demonstrations
and Aquinas’ which confers it, what is Maimonides’ stand? Both the first
and third demonstrations begin from premises about effects: the first proof
begins from a claim about motion, or change, in the sublunar sphere, the
third proof from the actual existence of sensible beings. Hence, both proofs
are demonstrations quia. Does Maimonides take them to be demonstrations?
As ibn Tibbon whom we cited earlier tells us, Maimonides’ use of
‘burhan’ provides no unequivocal test since he sometimes uses it figura-
tively or loosely.18 Maimonides himself also nowhere explicitly draws the
propter quid/quia distinction. But at least one of his major medieval commen-
tators, Moses of Narbonne (Narboni), understood the phrase ‘burhan qati ‘’
(literally: ‘a cutting demonstration,’ that is, conclusive or decisive; trans-
lated by ibn Tibbon as ‘mofet hotekh’ and by Pines as ‘cogent’ (p. 180)) in
exactly these terms.19 In his commentary on Guide I:71, Narboni writes:
This question, i.e., the eternity or creation of the world cannot be
apprehended (yagi‘u, lit: reached) by a decisive demonstration (mofet
hotekh) because it is a point before which the intellect stops (ma‘amad
hasekhel).20 By a ‘decisive demonstration’ (mofet hotekh) he [Mai-
monides] means what Aristotle called an ‘absolute demonstration’
18. On ibn Tibbon’s logical writing, see now James T. Robinson, “Samuel ibn
Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes and the Philosopher’s Proemium,” forthcoming
in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature. On mofet hotekh/burhan qati^ , see
fn.35.
19. See, however, the use of the term in II:15:290 (which Pines also translates
as “cogent demonstration”) where it does not seem to stand in opposition to a
re’ayah: ad. loc., 291, n.10 on the translation of the term hujaj which, rather than
dalil, is the term contrasted with demonstrations in this chapter; II:2:252 where
Maimonides explicitly claims that the necessary existence of the deity is “proved by
cogent (qati^) and certain (yaqin) demonstrations, regardless of whether the world
has come into being in time after having been nonexistent or whether it has not
come into being in time after having been nonexistent”; and Israel Efros, Philosophi-
cal Terms in the Moreh Nebukim (New York, 1924), p. 70. These passages require
additional investigation.
20. On this phrase, see also I:31:66–67, II:25:327
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(mofet muhlat) which is a demonstration of the cause (sibbah) and the
fact (metzi’ut). And this is true, because this species of demonstration is
very rare (yeqar metzi’uto). Only a few are to be found in natural notions,
and the existence of God is also explained (hitba’eir) in a demonstration
by proof (mofet re’ayah), that is to say, from the posterior [effects] (min
ha-mit’ahrim), not from the prior [causes] (lo’ min ha-qodmim), because
He, may He be blessed, is prior to all and nothing is prior to Him. And
how could [His existence] be explained by a demonstration from the
cause (mofet sibbah) and He, may He be blessed, is the cause of every-
thing and everything is His creation (beru’av)?21
It is clear here that Narboni is explicating Maimonides’ own phrase for a
decisive demonstration ‘burhan qati^ ’ as a demonstration propter quid, a
demonstration both of the fact stated in the conclusion of the syllogism and
of the reason why. He distinguishes it, in turn, from demonstrations quia
(mofet re’ayah), and explicitly identifies the demonstrations for the existence
of the deity as nothing more than quia proofs. A possible source for Nar-
boni’s identification of mofet hotekh, a ‘decisive’ demonstration, that is, a
demonstration that is propter quid, with what he calls a mofet muhlat, an
‘absolute’ demonstration, may have been Averroes who uses this terminol-
ogy while drawing the propter quid/quia distinction in both his Commentary
on the Prior Analytics and Long Commentary on the Metaphysics in the course of
criticizing (incorrectly, by the way) Avicenna’s idea that metaphysics proves
the existence of the Necessary Existent, or First Principle. Commenting on
Aristotle’s statement that “it is plainly evident that no master of any art can
demonstrate the proper principles of his own art” (Ana. Pr. I, 9, 76a16–17),
Averroes adds: “That is, by an absolute demonstration (demonstratione abso-
luta) which shows cause and existence. For the master of particular arts can
demonstrate the causes of his own subject through signs, or a posteriori.”22
Likewise, he contrasts the “method of an absolute demonstration (al-burhan
al-mutlaq) with “the method that proceeds from posterior propositions to
prior propositions or that which is called signs (al-dala’il).”23 Only by the
latter can one prove the existence of the first principle or first mover.
Maimonides, as I said, gives us nothing as explicit as Averroes or
21. Der Commentar des Rabbi Moses Narbonensis su dem werke More Nebuchim des
Maimonides (Heb.), ed. J. Goldenthal (Wien, 1852), 15b–16a.
22. Commentary on the Prior Analytics, in the Commentaria Magna, Com. 70, f. 154
DF, cited in H. A. Wolfson, “Averroes’ Lost Treatise on the Prime Mover,” in Studies
in the History of Philosophy and Religion, ed. I. Twersky and G. H. Williams, 2 vols.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), I:402–29, 411.
23. Commentary on the Metaphysics, cited and trans. in Wolfson, “Averroes’ Lost
Treatise,” p. 414, from Tafsir ma ba^ad at-tabi^at, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: 1938–1948).
On Al-Farabi’s use of the term ‘mutlaq/mutlaqa’ in application to propositions (not
demonstrations or syllogisms), as in ‘muqaddama mutlaqa,’ which does not have the
sense of propter quid but rather that of ‘assertoric,’ see J. Lameer, Al-Farabi and
Aristotelian Syllogistics (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 55–62.
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Narboni, but, since the distinction was clearly taken to heart by his prede-
cessors, contemporaries, and successors, I think we can safely assume that
Maimonides would have known and acknowledged it as well.24 Let me
point out two passages where he appears to be assuming the distinction
and, like Avicenna and Averroes, to be saying that demonstrations quia do
not furnish us with knowledge on a par with the understanding furnished
by arguments whose middle terms are causes that explain their conclu-
sions.
The first passage reads:
There is an immense difference between guidance leading to a knowl-
edge of the existence of a thing and an investigation of the true reality
of the essence and substance of that thing. The reason is that guidance
leading to the knowledge of the existence of a thing can be had even
if that should be through the accidents of the thing or through its acts
or through a relation—which may be very remote from the thing
(I:46:97).
Maimonides draws two distinctions here. The first distinguishes between
existence and essence, the second between “guidance leading to knowl-
edge” and “an investigation of true reality.” Although the two are not
unconnected, it is the latter that concerns us: the difference between
knowledge simply that something is the case, the fact, inferred from its
accidents, relations, or acts—all effects—and knowledge why something
must be the case, its causes or reality, from which we infer that it is the case
in fact. Maimonides goes on to illustrate what he means by “guidance
leading to knowledge” using the parable of the ruler of the city, whose
existence is “proven” from his appearance, relations, acts, and, most fa-
mously, the existence of law and order in the city, “the cause of which is the
fear of the ruler and the anticipation of the punishment he metes out”
(I:46:98). All of this, Maimonides concludes, “is a proof (dalil) of the fact
that this city has a king.” Prima facie, the ruler of this parable corresponds
to the ruler of I:70 who is identified with the “rider of the heavens,” the
“deity who is the mover of the highest heaven” and whose existence is
proven in the first proof of II:1. Note that the issue is not the difference
between knowing the existence versus knowing the essence of God, but rather
the difference between proving simply the fact that God exists versus prov-
ing the fact of His existence by way of a reason, or cause, why He must exist.
What makes both the example of I:46 and the first proof for the existence
24. The references cited in the text are far from exhaustive. See, for example,
Al-Farabi, “The Attainment of Happiness,” 4:18–5:10, 6:11–7:9, 9:17–10:2, in Al-
farabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. M. Mahdi (New York: The Free Press,
1962); Al-Ghazali, Treatise on Logic: Proemium and Fifth Maneria, trans. J. L. Longeway
from C. H. Lohr, Traditio 21 (1965): 223–90, ms., Proemium 2. A full history of the
propter quid/quia distinction remains to be written.
MAIMONIDES’ DEMONSTRATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 59
of God a “proof” simply of the fact is that the premises for the conclusion
are effects, not causes.25
The second passage is a statement that has been a source of controversy
since Samuel ibn Tibbon. At the end of II:24, the chapter in which Mai-
monides addresses the various incompatibilities between Ptolemaic astron-
omy and Aristotelian cosmology that led to the so-called Andalusian Revolt,
he concludes
Regarding all that is in the heavens, man grasps nothing but a small
measure of what is mathematical; and you know what is in it. . . . [T]he
deity alone fully knows the true reality, the nature, the substance, the
form, the motions, and the causes of the heavens. . . . For it is impossi-
ble for us to accede to the points starting from which conclusions may
be drawn about the heavens; for the latter are too far away from and
too high in place and in rank. And even the general conclusion that
may be drawn from them, namely, that they prove the existence of their
Mover, is a matter the knowledge of which cannot be reached by
human intellects. (II:24:326–27)
For present purposes, the difficulty is the last sentence that seems to con-
tradict Maimonides’ statements elsewhere in the Guide that the “revolution
of the heaven” is “the greatest proof through which one can know the
existence of the deity” (I:70:175; I:9:34–35; II:18:302).26 Based on a mar-
ginal notation of ibn Tibbon, one scribe went so far as to emend the text to
eliminate the contradiction. Recent translators of the Guide and its com-
mentators have offered a variety of textual solutions.27 I do not intend to
enter into translation issues. In light of our previous discussion, I think we
can appreciate the philosophical force of Maimonides’ statement regardless
of the translation questions.
25. Maimonides begins this passage by referring the reader to an earlier
passage where he says he already drew the distinction. Most commentators take the
pertinent chapter to be I:33:71. I am not confident that this is the correct antece-
dent, but I cannot identify an alternative at this time. On this chapter and the
parable of the king, see now Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics, pp. 60–65, who relates
the chapter, among other Maimonidean texts, to a midrash in Genesis Rabbah 39:I
(and parallels) according to which Abraham arrived at “an illuminated castle” (birah
doleqet) and exclaims: “Could you say this castle has no governor (manhig).” On this
parable and its interpretation, see also II:11:275 and III:13:454. I intend to discuss
these chapters elsewhere.
26. See also Mishneh Torah, “Laws of the Foundation of the Torah,” 1:5, 7 in
which Maimonides argues from the eternity of the motion of the spheres both for
the existence of a nonbodily, nonfinite Mover and for His incorporeality and unity.
27. On ibn Tibbon’s translation, see Pines’s n.12 on Guide II:24:327. For
discussion of the problematic text, its translation, and solutions to the contradic-
tion, see Kraemer, “Maimonides on Aristotle,” p. 79; Munk, Guide II:194–95, n.4;
Kafih, ad.loc.; Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment, Physics, and Doubt,”
and Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge.”
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To begin with, the statement that something is the “greatest proof” or
that “that there is no proof like it” may mean nothing more than that there
is no proof greater or better than it. It need not mean that the power of the
proof is itself strong or great; it may simply be the best we can do with our
limited intellectual resources. Now, throughout this chapter, as I have ar-
gued elsewhere, Maimonides is intent on distinguishing between (prior)
causes from which we can deduce conclusions that not only establish the
celestial facts but explain them propter quid, and effects of the heavens from
which we can deduce quia the celestial facts alone.28 Along the same lines,
demonstrations through which we can deduce and explain propter quid that
the deity exists should be distinguished from demonstrations quia that only
establish the fact that God does exist. But if we only possess demonstrations
quia, hence, unexplained conclusions, for the movements of the heavens
themselves, and those motions are, in any case, effects from which we can
only draw conclusions quia for the existence of their Mover, such quia
deductions will not be proper demonstrations of the existence of a Mover
for Maimonides, hence, not the stuff of knowledge truly apprehended by
the intellect. It should, perhaps, be added in this connection that the term
translated here as ‘proof’ is dalil, not the Arabic term burhan, the term
Avicenna and (according to Pines) Maimonides usually reserves for true
demonstrations, that is to say, demonstrations propter quid.29
The reason why the motions of the heavens only furnish a proof quia
of the existence of the deity is the same reason Maimonides constantly
repeats why we lack a demonstration of the eternity of the world. We have
no explanation for the apparent ‘irregularities’ that characterize the heav-
enly motions; hence, we cannot demonstrate why as well as that the heavens
move as they do.30 Hence, we cannot claim that those motions are necessary
and, therefore, eternal—for the claim of causal necessity would presuppose
a demonstration that furnishes an explanation and understanding of the
fact. Similarly, we cannot demonstrate propter quid—in short, we cannot
demonstrate—on the basis of those motions that the deity exists. This, I would
suggest, is the deficiency to which Maimonides is referring when he says
28. See “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge and the Limitations of the
Intellect.”
29. Cf. III:14:456–57. It should be admitted, as noted in n.19, that Mai-
monides’ use of burhan is not always, or consistently, restricted to demonstrations
propter quid.
30. See “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge and the Limitations of the
Intellect.” To avoid a possible misunderstanding (pointed out by an anonymous
referee) of the quoted passage, Maimonides’ awkward formulation (which is pre-
served according to all the variant translations, cited in n.27) runs together (i)
knowledge of the existence of the deity from acquaintance with a proof and (ii)
knowledge that a proof is a proof of the existence of the deity. Maimonides allows
for the possibility that we might someday have a demonstration propter quid of the
celestial facts; even so, the knowledge we would thereby possess would not furnish
us with a demonstration propter quid of the existence of the deity, or first mover.
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that “the general conclusion” to be drawn from the heavens, namely,
“knowledge of [the existence of their Mover], cannot be reached by human
intellects.”31
Finally, the causal/explanatory condition on demonstrations can
throw some light on yet another notorious feature of Maimonides’ argu-
ment for the existence of God. Maimonides famously insists that neither the
doctrine of creation nor that of eternity can be demonstrated; for this
reason, he attacks the Kalam proofs that make the existence of God rest on
creation. Yet, whenever he proves the existence of God, both in the Guide
and in the “Laws of the Basic Principles of the Torah” (Hilkhot Yesodei
HaTorah) in the Book of Knowledge (Sefer Madda^ ) of his great code, the
Mishneh Torah, Maimonides’ own proofs explicitly employ the premise of
eternity—which, no less than creation, also cannot be demonstrated.32
Substituting eternity for creation, Maimonides’ own arguments ought to be
vulnerable to the same objection he raises against the Kalam.
To wiggle his way out of this corner, Maimonides tells us that the ‘full’
structure of his argument is to demonstrate the existence of God without
assuming specifically either creation or eternity. What he means by this is that
he will prove the existence of God by the following dilemma. Either the
world is created (generated) or it is eternal (ungenerated). If it is created,
it follows trivially that it has a Creator; hence, the (or a) deity exists. If it is
eternal, from the four demonstrations of II:1, it also follows that there must
exist a deity. So, on either disjunct, God exists, and the two disjuncts are
exhaustive. Therefore, God exists. Q.E.D.33
31. Similarly according to Davidson’s translation of the passage; see “Mai-
monides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” pp. 102–3.
32. I shall argue below that the third proof is also made by Maimonides to
depend on eternity.
33. Most commentators assume that the disjunctive premise (“The world can-
not but be either eternal or created/generated.”) should be formalized as ‘p or
not-p,’ i.e., as an instance of excluded middle. It is not obvious to me that this is how
the premise ought to be understood. Even if the two alternatives are exhaustive
contraries, the dilemma does not turn on the formal validity of an instance of
excluded middle. Hence, it is probably more correct to state the premise as ‘p or r.’
On this last concern, see below. Furthermore, even if the argument is demonstrative,
it would surely be “stronger” or “more compelling” if we could demonstrate the
existence of God on grounds entirely independent of either creation or eternity. That
is, this argument may not “rest” specifically on one to the exclusion of the other of its
disjuncts. But it does “rest” on the disjunction. Suppose we could demonstrate the
existence of the deity without resting it on the disjunction. For example, Avicenna’s
own demonstration of the existence of the being necessarily existent in virtue of itself
does not suppose either eternity or creation; hence, it is not invariant over but
independent of the two disjuncts. Such a demonstration, even if no more deductively
valid than the one given, would still be more compelling. If Maimonides really wanted
a demonstration for the existence of God that did not “depend” in any way on an
undemonstrated premise, he therefore would have had such a option available in
Avicenna’s metaphysical proof. Why didn’t he employ (only) that argument?
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Maimonides’ strategy is either ingenious or disingenuous, and his
readers have debated its validity from the start.34 I shall not rehearse the
many questions that have been raised; let me simply point out one conse-
quence of the causal/explanatory condition on demonstrations for the
argument form in question.
When Maimonides repeatedly claims that we cannot demonstrate either
creation or eternity, he means that we cannot provide explanations for either,
and we thereby lack a kind of knowledge or understanding of the respective
claims. But both eternity and creation are themselves effects of the exist-
ence of God, not causes. Therefore, in arguing from them, even disjunc-
tively, for the existence of God, we are giving at most another non-
explanatory demonstration quia, from effects to cause. So we begin with two
disjunctive premises, eternity (P) and creation (Q), neither of which Mai-
monides avows is demonstrated (propter quid)—which is to say that we
cannot explain either conclusion. So, even if P and Q are exhaustive and
exclusive alternatives—and, note, they are only material, not formal con-
tradictories—their disjunction P or Q will still not be demonstrated (propter
quid). After all, if neither P nor Q has an explanation, it is difficult to see
how the disjunction P or Q could have an explanation. So the disjunctive
premise whose two alternatives are effects is also undemonstrated (propter
quid). But then the conclusion that God exists drawn from undemonstrated
effects may follow formally from the disjunctive premise, but it also remains
unexplained and, hence, undemonstrated (propter quid). Even Maimonides’
disjunctive method cannot pull a demonstration out of a hat of less-than-
demonstrative rabbits.
To conclude this section, let me summarize the central argument
thusfar. Interpreters who take Maimonides to have believed that it is possi-
ble for humans to have knowledge of metaphysics typically argue as fol-
lows:35 On the one hand, it is agreed by all parties that humans have no
knowledge of the essence of the deity; hence, no special view about the
limitations of human knowledge is necessary to substantiate that claim. On
the other, since Maimonides explicitly demonstrates that the deity exists, he
thereby demonstrates that he does have some knowledge of metaphysics.
So if we carefully respect the essence/existence distinction, it is difficult to
see what basis there can be for views denying all knowledge of metaphysics
to Maimonides. In reply, I have argued that, granted the essence/existence
34. See Davidson, Proofs and “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge”;
Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment, Physics, and Doubt”; and Leo Strauss,
“How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Perplexed,” in the Pines trans. of the Guide,
pp. xi–1vi, 1ii.
35. See, e.g., Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope
of Metaphysics,” in his collection of essays Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen
Aufklarung (Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987), pp. 60–129, 116–17;
Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” p. 87; Ivry, “Logical and
Scientific Premises,” p. 85.
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distinction, if one intends to demonstrate the existence of the deity in the
full Aristotelian sense, one must be in a position to furnish a demonstration
propter quid, hence, a (if not the) cause of His existence. Such a cause may
or may not be (per impossibile, part of) the essence of the deity but, without
knowledge of it, one cannot produce the kind of demonstration that con-
stitutes understanding and, hence, knowledge of His existence. And with-
out knowledge (at least) of the existence of the deity, there is no evidence
that Maimonides thought that it is possible for humans to have true knowl-
edge of metaphysics, the caliber of knowledge that would lead to or be
identified with union with the Active Intellect. To be sure, Maimonides does
demonstrate quia the existence of God, and quia proofs are demonstrations
in the (weaker) sense that they give us reason, even good reason, to believe
in their conclusion. What they do not give us is the kind of full under-
standing and knowledge of its content that a scientific demonstration propter
quid gives. It is in the weaker sense, then, that Maimonides professes to have
“demonstrated” the existence of the deity while, at the same time, he
expects his informed reader to know what his demonstrations are not.
II
Thus far I have argued that one function of Maimonides’ demonstrations is
to give reason to believe certain propositions even though they do not fur-
nish the kind of understanding of those propositions that would constitute
(scientific) knowledge of metaphysics. But they also do more than that, as I
shall argue in section III. In order to see how they serve this additional
purpose, it is necessary to take a closer look at their substantive arguments. I
shall concentrate on Maimonides’ third demonstration. We can divide the
proof into two parts: The first part (A) begins with an empirical datum and
proceeds to prove that, among actual existents, some are subject to genera-
tion and corruption and some not, that is, some are necessarily existent and
some not. The second part (B) argues that among these necessarily existent
beings, one must be necessarily existent in virtue of itself (or its own essence)
and, given the incorporeality and unity of such a being, it is the deity.
A.
1. There are many existents we perceive with the senses.
Remark: The argument begins with an empirical observation.
2. These existents are either (i) all subject to neither generation nor
corruption or (ii) all subject to generation and corruption or (iii)
some are subject to generation and corruption and some are not.
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Remark: That is, they are either (i) all without beginning or end (i.e.,
all eternal), or (ii) all with both beginning and end (i.e., none eternal),
or (iii) some have and some do not have a beginning and/or end (i.e.,
some are eternal, some not).
3. The first alternative (i) is absurd: our senses perceive at least some
existents subject to both generation and corruption, coming into and
going out of existence.
4. The second alternative (ii) is also absurd:
(a) If everything is subject to generation and corruption, then every-
thing “has a possibility of undergoing corruption.” But “what is possible
with respect to a species must come about.” Therefore, all existents will
necessarily cease to exist at some time. But if everything were to cease
to exist at some time, then nothing would exist to cause anything to
exist (subsequently, e.g., now) or to (have) come into existence (sub-
sequently, e.g., now). That is, nothing comes from nothing.
(b) But we do perceive things to exist; e.g., we ourselves exist.
(c) Hence, not everything can be subject to generation and corrup-
tion.
5. Therefore, while there do exist some things subject to generation and
corruption (as the senses demonstrate), there must also exist some-
thing that is not subject to generation and corruption, something
whose “existence is necessary, not possible.”
Remark: By ‘necessary,’ Maimonides clearly means: eternal, i.e.,
subject to neither corruption nor generation.
B.
6. Anything whose existence is necessary (eternal) is necessary either “in
respect to its own essence or in respect to the cause of this existence.”
7. Anything that is necessary in respect to the cause of its existence is
possible (of existence or nonexistence) in respect to its own essence.
(Premise 19)
8. If a necessarily existent being is possible in respect to its own essence,
then there must be some other existent which causes it to exist and this
other existent must be necessary of existence. (Premise 19)
9. Among such causes that are each necessary of existence, “it has been
demonstrated that” there must indubitably be an existent that is neces-
sary of existence in respect to its own essence. For if there were no
being necessary of existence in respect to its own essence, there would
be neither noneternal beings nor, as Aristotle says, eternal beings—be-
ings caused to exist by a cause that is necessary of existence.
Remark: Maimonides does not identify the demonstration in ques-
tion but it “is a demonstration concerning which there can be no
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doubt, no refutation, and no dispute, except on the part of one who is
ignorant of the method of demonstration.”
10. Any being that is necessary of existence in respect to its own essence
can have no cause (Premise 20) and therefore no internal multiplicity
(“multiplicity of notions”) (Premise 21); if it did, the multiplicity
would, per impossibile, be a cause of the existence of the being that is
necessary of existence in respect to its own essence.
11. Therefore, a being that is necessary of existence in respect to its own
essence cannot be corporeal, a body or force in a body. (Premise 22)
12. This being that is necessary of existence in respect to its own essence
and that is uncaused, simple, and incorporeal is the deity.
13. There is at most one such being that is necessary of existence in respect
to its own essence.
(a) If there were more than one such being, then the notion of the
species of being necessary of existence in respect to its own essence
would be a notion “superadded” to the essence of each such being.
(b) If (a), then neither of these beings would be necessary of exist-
ence in virtue only of itself but in virtue of the notion of the species it
possesses.
(c) If (b), each such being necessary of existence in respect to its
own essence would consist of a “duality” of notions (its own essence and
the notion of the species). But this contradicts the “latter’s absolute
simplicity and absolute perfection” and the fact that it can have no
cause.
(d) It follows that “nothing at all can be associated with” the neces-
sary of existence in virtue of its own essence.
Maimonides’ exposition is puzzling for a number of reasons. First, of
its two parts, A is much better worked out than B. Indeed, step 9, which
concludes that there exists the being that is necessary of existence in respect
to its own essence, merely states that this “has been demonstrated” without
even hinting how or where. This, however, is the crucial step in the proof.
Second, although it was assumed by Maimonides’ medieval commen-
tators that his idea of the necessarily existent being in respect to its own
essence is adapted from Avicenna, the argument of A is not Avicennian. On
the A argument, necessary and possible existence are mutually exclusive.
Possible existents are those that undergo generation and corruption; nec-
essary existents are eternal. According to Avicenna, on the other hand, the
notions of possible and necessary existence are not mutually exclusive. In
all but one case, everything that actually exists is both possible and neces-
sary: it is possible of existence in virtue of its own essence (there is no
contradiction if we suppose the thing not to exist) and necessary of exist-
ence through a cause. The one exception is the deity, the being that is
necessary of existence in respect to its own essence, who, Avicenna argues,
must exist for the following reason: Suppose all actual beings are possible
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in themselves and necessitated to exist through a cause, and let T be the
totality of all such beings. T then is only possible of existence in itself and
necessitated to exist through a cause C. But C cannot itself be possible of
existence in itself and necessitated to exist through a cause; for if it were, by
hypothesis it would be an element of T and no member of a totality can be
a cause of the existence of the totality of which it is an element. Hence, C
must be external to T. But if T contains all beings that are possible in
themselves and necessitated through a cause, and C is external to T, then C
cannot be possible in itself and necessitated through a cause. Hence, there
must exist something necessarily existent in respect to its own essence.36
Maimonides’ A argument is not of this form. Indeed Herbert Davidson
has argued that Maimonides instead held an alternative view, like that of
Averroes, who criticized Avicenna. Furthermore, Davidson argues that both
Maimonides and Averroes seriously misunderstood Avicenna.37 According
to Averroes, the possible is that which might not exist, i.e., that is subject to
generation and corruption. The necessary is simply the eternal (including
that which is caused). According to Averroes, not everything actual can be
possible (generated and destructible) because, since everything possible
requires a cause to bring it into actuality, a chain consisting exclusively of
possible existents in which one actualized possible being causes another
would lead to an infinite regress. Therefore, there must exist something
necessary (eternal). By similar reasoning, not all eternal beings can be
caused for that would also lead to an infinite regress. Therefore, there must
exist a necessary, or eternal, being that exists in virtue of itself that is not
caused. Thus Averroes’ formulation of the argument is marked by two
stages—from the possible (corruptible) to the necessary (eternal) through
a cause and from the latter to the necessary in itself—and the crucial step in
both stages of the argument turns on the impossibility of an infinite regress.
A similar interpretation, Davidson claims, should be given to Mai-
monides’ argument. Like Averroes, Maimonides first shows (in A) that
something must be eternal; he then (in B) demonstrates that there must be
something eternal (necessary) in virtue of its own essence. At both stages,
and especially at step 9, Davidson proposes Maimonides’ argument is the
impossibility of an infinite regress.
Davidson is right that Maimonides’ argument is not a straightforward
version of Avicenna’s, but neither is it Averroes’. First, Maimonides’ own
explicit argument in A (step 4) is not an argument from the impossibility
of an infinite regress; so there isn’t the same motivation to think that the
36. This argument is given by Avicenna in his Najat and Shifa; the relevant
sections are translated in Hourani, “Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence.”
On Avicenna’s argument, see also L. E. Goodman, Avicenna (London: Routledge,
1992), pp. 49–122 and Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, pp. 261–65.
37. Davidson does not claim that Maimonides was actually familiar with Aver-
roes’ formulation; instead he suggests that they both had “incomplete information
about Avicenna’s proof” and “similar sources.” See p. 383 n.24.
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unstated argument (‘as has been demonstrated’) at step 9 is also an argu-
ment from the impossibility of an infinite regress.38 I shall return in a
moment to a second candidate for the argument at step 9.
Second, the A argument is itself rather obscure. Even if, pace step 4,
everything is subject to corruption and everything ceases to exist at some
time, prima facie it does not follow that there is a single time at which
everything ceases to exist. And it is the latter possibility that is required for
the proof. But there is also a reply to this objection. Assuming a version of
the principle of plenitude, every possibility must be actualized at some
time.39 And among these possibilities, there will be, in addition to the
possibility that each thing will cease to exist at some (but not necessarily the
same) time, also the possibility that at some one time the totality of corrupt-
ible existents will cease to exist. The actualization of this possibility will
clinch the proof.
However, this reply is also problematic. The principle of plenitude
obtains only on the assumption that time is infinite, only if we assume the
eternity of the world and spheres. In a finite span of time, not every
possibility will necessarily be actualized. But then the argument that pur-
ports to show that there must exist some existent that is not subject to
generation and corruption, that is eternal, assumes what it seeks to prove.40
Furthermore, as some of Maimonides’ greatest medieval critics and
commentators—Hasdai Crescas, Joseph Kaspi, and Efodi (Profiat Duran)
already noted—the argument must not only presuppose eternity but eter-
nity a parte ante.41 Otherwise, one might object that the possibility that all
38. Maimonides does appeal to an argument from the impossibility of an
infinite regress to show that proximate causes cannot “go on to infinity” (II:12:277).
However, this is clearly limited to the “created” world, not to the necessary existent.
He also appeals to the impossibility of an “infinite series” to support the existence
of a “necessarily existent in which there is no possibility” in his critique of the Kalam
in I:76:230.
39. Cf. Charles Manekin, “Problems of ‘Plenitude’ in Maimonides and Ger-
sonides,” in A Straight Faith: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture, ed. R. Link-
Salinger et al. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), pp.
183–94. According to Manekin, Maimonides holds that each possibility with respect
to a species is realized at some moment of time, meaning that at all moments of
time every possibility with respect to a species is instantiated in at least one member
of the species. So, if corruption is a possibility with respect to every member of the
species, there will be some time when every member will have ceased to exist. On
the letter to ibn Tibbon on which Manekin bases this interpretation, see also Isaiah
Sonne, “Maimonides’ Letter to Samuel ibn Tibbon according to an Unknown Text
in the Archives of the Jewish Community of Verona” (Heb.), Tarbiz 10 (1939):
135–54.
40. If the argument did indeed work, one might wonder why that would not
be a demonstration of eternity?
41. See Hasdai Crescas, Light of the Lord I, I, 29; Joseph Kaspi, Commentary on
the Guide II:1, and Efodi, Commentary on the Guide II:1 n.8; and for discussion,
Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics, pp. 77–82.
68 JOSEF STERN
existent entities will cease to exist might yet be realized in the future; hence,
the fact that something now exists is no evidence against the lemma that
everything is subject to generation and corruption. Only if an infinite
amount of time has already passed, without everything having already been
corrupted, can we say that there must be something incorruptible given
that we now exist.
Unlike Avicenna’s own proof, then, Maimonides’ argument, or at least
the A half, presupposes the controversial and undemonstrated Premise 26,
the eternity of the world. On the other hand, it is not clear that the A
argument is really necessary for the B argument—which would not be
surprising if the B argument were Avicennean, since Avicenna’s own argu-
ment does not rest on eternity. The disjunction in step 9 seems to say that
it is not necessary for the B argument that there be something eternal
through a cause; regardless of whether everything is originated and cor-
rupted or whether it is eternal, there must be a necessary of existence in
virtue of itself. In that case, the A argument can simply drop out. Why, then,
the detour through eternity?
I will return to this question in section III, but there is also a third
reason not to assimilate Maimonides’ third proof to Averroes’ model. Aver-
roes’ candidate for the being that is necessary in virtue of its own essence,
his first uncaused cause, is a separate intellect. It may or may not be the
intellect causally responsible for the outermost sphere, but it is an intellect.
On the other hand, Maimonides’ necessary existent in virtue of its essence,
like Avicenna’s, is more transcendent than any of the separate intellects
whose existence is indicated by their causal roles in relation to the spheres.
Indeed for both Maimonides and Avicenna, the necessary existent in virtue
of its essence is not an intellect, period.
Maimonides discusses the necessary existent in virtue of its own es-
sence only in nine other chapters of the Guide apart from II:1 (and in most
of these cases only in passing): in I:52, I:57, I:58, I:60, I:61, I:63, I:74, I:76,
and II:4. In two other chapters (I:69 and I:72), he describes the deity in
terms reminiscent of the necessary existent, and he alludes to it in his
exposition of Ma^aseh Merkavah, the “Account of the Chariot.” Finally, his
description of the deity in the opening chapter of the “Laws of the Basic
Principles of the Torah” in the Mishneh Torah (1:1–3) appears to present
Him as the necessarily existent being in virtue of its essence.42 Despite the
relatively unsystematic explicit discussion in these passages, there emerges
from them a sufficiently rich depiction of this being that is more like
Avicenna’s than Averroes’.
42. See, however, the fifth ruling (halakhah) in the same chapter (Mishneh
Torah, “Laws of the Basic Principles of the Torah” 1:5) where Maimonides also
describes this being as the mover of the sphere, apparently identifying the first
mover with the necessary existent, as his explicit presentation in Guide II:1 would
also suggest. I return to this issue below.
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For our purposes, the most salient characteristic of the necessary exis-
tent in respect to itself is its absolute simplicity, unity, or oneness, the fact
that in its being there is only “one notion in which there is no idea of
multiplicity.” Not only does the necessarily existent in respect to itself not
participate in composition of form and matter; it also does not participate
in the multiplicity of essence and existence or in the ‘syntactic composition-
ality’ induced by subject-predicate (or substance- or substratum-attribute)
syntax or in any other kind of internal divisibility of notions.43 Moreover,
Maimonides quickly realizes the difficulties that attend any attempt to use
any language, including philosophically regimented idioms, to describe the
necessary existent in respect to itself—including its very existence and
oneness: All such attempts run afoul of its unity and absolute oneness. His
main attempt is through formulae that retract with one hand what they
ascribe with the other:
Consequently He exists, but not through an existence other than His
essence; and similarly He lives, but not through life; He is powerful, but
not through power; he knows, but not through knowledge. For all these
attributes refer back to one notion in which there is no idea of multi-
plicity, as will be made clear. (I:57:132)
At the same time, he realizes the futility of these linguistic attempts to
represent the necessary existent, for
these subtle notions that very clearly elude the minds cannot be con-
sidered through the instrumentality of the customary words. . . . For
the bounds of expression in all languages are very narrow indeed, so
that we cannot represent this notion to ourselves except through a
certain looseness of expression. . . . We give the gist of the notion and
give the mind the correct direction toward the true reality of the matter
when we say, one but not through oneness, just as we say eternal in
order to indicate that he has not come into being in time. (I:57:132–33)
Maimonides’ point here is semantic and epistemological as well as meta-
physical. As in Avicenna, the necessary existent in virtue of its essence is
metaphysically distinct from everything else. Unlike Averroes’ necessary
existent in virtue of its essence which is necessary in the same sense of
‘necessary,’ that is, eternal, as the necessary existents in virtue of a cause,
Avicenna’s necessary existent in virtue of its essence is not eternal—if
‘eternal’ means what it does for other things that are eternal but caused.
The predicates ‘eternal’ and, hence, ‘necessary’ have entirely different
meanings when applied to the necessary existent in virtue of its essence and
when applied to everything else. Likeness, the predicate ‘exist’ has a com-
43. On these kinds of multiplicity, see my “Logical Syntax.”
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pletely different meaning in representations of the deity from what it has in
representations of other beings: It does not denote an attribute or accident.
For the same reason, the compound ‘necessary existent’ is entirely equivo-
cal when representing the deity; again, it is not an attribute. Here Mai-
monides goes beyond Avicenna in making the metaphysical distinction
between the necessary existent in virtue of itself and those things whose
existence is necessitated by a cause into a semantic distinction as well. But
this semantic difference, which is in part a reflection of “the summary
fashion of which words are indicative” (I:57:133), is not merely a deficiency
of words, or external speech; it reflects the limitations of human apprehen-
sion. The absolute simplicity and oneness of the necessary existent in virtue
of its own essence make it impossible for humans to understand anything
of its essence and even of its existence. Thus “we are only able to apprehend
the fact that He is (’anniyya) and cannot apprehend His quiddity (mahiyya)”
(I:58:135). As I have argued elsewhere, Maimonides’ use of ’anniyya here
may be an attempt to avoid the predicate for ‘existence’ (wujud) applied to
God. Because of its absolute equivocation in its application to God (and its
syntactic role as a predicate designating an attribute), he may wish to let us
know that we cannot apprehend that God exists, only the fact that He is.44 It
is with these epistemological and semantic considerations in mind that
Maimonides concludes:
What then should be the state of our intellects when they aspire to
apprehend Him who is without matter and is simple to the utmost
degree of simplicity, Him whose existence is necessary, Him who has no
cause and to whom no notion attaches that is superadded to His
essence, which is perfect—the meaning of its perfection being that all
deficiencies are negated with respect to it—we who only apprehend the
fact that He is (’anniyya)?
The necessary existent in virtue of itself is not only metaphysically distinct
from all other beings; all our representations of this being are also seman-
tically distinct, purely equivocal, syntactically noncomposite, and unknow-
able or mysterious.45
44. See my “Logical Syntax” and W. Z. Harvey and S. Harvey, “A Note on the
Arabic Term ’Anniyya/’Aniyya/’Inniyya” (in Heb.), Iyyun (1989): 167–71.
45. See also Maimonides’ claims that the Tetragrammaton “gives a clear un-
equivocal indication of His essence, . . . perhaps . . . the notion of a necessary
existence” (I:61:147–48) and that the divine phrasal name ‘I am that I am,’ whose
“whole secret consists in the repetition in a predicative position of the very word
indicative of existence” (I:63:154), “makes it clear that He is existent not through
existence . . . the existent that is the existent, or the necessarily existent. This is what
demonstration necessarily leads to: namely to the view that there is a necessarily
existent thing that has never been, or ever will be, nonexistent” (I:63:155).
Throughout these passages Maimonides’ emphasis on underived and syntactically
simple names extends the Avicennean metaphysics to the semantics (or logical
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Given this characterization of the necessarily existent being in itself, we
are also now in a position to appreciate the full force of the claim that we
cannot demonstrate the existence of the deity propter quid. Indeed one may
wonder how it is possible to construct even a valid proof quia for the exist-
ence of the deity; for if we begin with actual existents, any such proof will
inevitably falter on a fallacy of equivocation at some step in the argument.46
Our epistemic situation might be described as follows: As good Aristotelians
we cannot but seek causes for effects and thereby come to acknowledge an
ultimate cause, a deity; but when we pause to reflect on what our reasoning
(quia) has led us to, we must also admit we do not understand the deity we
have proven to exist. That is, given the tight connection between (Aristote-
lian causal) explanation and understanding, if we cannot demonstrate the
existence of the deity from its causes (propter quid), there is a real sense in
which we cannot understand (even) what we have demonstrated (quia) to
exist. So, the demonstration quia compels us to believe, on the basis of
known effects, that there exists some cause that is necessary in respect to
itself, but we lack all understanding (by way of, per impossibile, its causes) of
what that cause is. The force of the quia demonstration derives from the
causal reasoning we do understand (up to, say, step 9) but, without detract-
ing from that force, our complete lack of understanding of the conclusion is
the full import of our inability to produce a demonstration propter quid.47
This is, perhaps, one perplexity to which the Guide guides us.
With this consequence in hand, I now want to turn to the argument for
the existence of the necessary existent in itself to which Maimonides alludes
at step 9 of the B argument. Here again we shall meet the same perplexity.
Recall that I suggested earlier, contra Davidson, that there is no evidence
syntax) of representation. Note also that Maimonides explicitly states in the last
quotation that there is a demonstration (burhan) of the existence of the necessarily
existent (in virtue of its own essence). It is curious, however, that in the very next
sentence, in describing God’s exchange with Moses in Ex. 3, he first says that God
“made known to [Moses] the proofs (al-dalil) that would establish His existence
among their men of knowledge,” and then that Moses replied that “they have
accepted by means of these intellectual demonstrations the view that there is an
existent deity” (I:63:155). Here there seems to be a miscommunication between
God and Moses: what God presents as simply proofs, Moses takes to be demonstrations.
Could this be a hint concerning Maimonides’ own promised demonstrations of the
necessarily existent?
46. I am indebted here to Kenneth Seeskin for pressing me on this point.
47. The strength of the fallacy of equivocation, and hence the degree to which
we lack a demonstration (propter quid), will directly vary with the degree to which
one pushes Maimonides’ equivocation thesis: the more radical the equivocation,
the greater the fallacy, and the less valid the demonstration (propter quid). For what
appears to be the weaker reading, see Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment,”
p. 161: “The Avicennian proof, even if perfectly valid, is thus not thoroughly compre-
hensible and presumably never will be” (my italics). On my analysis in the text, the
Avicennian proof or, more precisely, its conclusion is thoroughly incomprehensible.
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that the issue is the impossibility of an infinite regress. What, then, is the
argument?
As we have seen, in II:1, Maimonides argues for the existence of a single
(unmoved) mover of the sphere, or fifth body. But three chapters later, in
II:4, he describes how, given present scientific knowledge of the heavens, it
must be assumed that there are multiple spheres, each of which is moved by
its own respective mover, a separate intellect. Now, none of these separate
intellects can strictly speaking be individuated (because of their immaterial-
ity) but each is nonetheless distinguished from the others by its respective
emanational, or causal, relations, both to its respective sphere and to other
intellects.48 Furthermore, while the separate intellects are identified with
the biblical angels (mal’akhim) who, in turn, are equivocally designated by
the same term ‘Elohim’ that designates the deity (I:2), Maimonides repeat-
edly distinguishes the deity from any of the separate intellects, including the
first intellect that moves the outermost sphere whom the deity “brought into
existence” (II:4:258). This already is significant, because Maimonides’ first
proof for the existence of the deity appeared to identify the deity with a
mover of a sphere. However, this is not all. Having laid out the hierarchy of
separate intellects, Maimonides next states:
It cannot be true that the intellect that moves the highest sphere
should be identical with the necessary of existence. For it has in com-
mon with the other intellects one separately conceivable thing, namely,
that represented by the act of causing bodies to move. Now every
intellect is distinguished from any other intellect with respect to one
separately conceivable thing. In consequence each one of the ten
intellects is endowed with two separately conceivable things. Accord-
ingly there can be no doubt that all of them have one first cause.
(II:4:259)49
48. Cf. Mishneh Torah, “Laws of the Foundation of the Torah,” 2:5–6. On
Maimonides’ statement in this context, that Aristotle’s “opinions” about “the causes
of the motions of the spheres” “from which he deduced the existence of separate
intellects” are “assertions for which no demonstration has been made” (II:3:254),
see Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” pp. 73–78. Although I
cannot address his objections in detail, the reservations he raises about Pines’s
translation and the substantive claims he goes on to make do not seem to me to
affect Pines’s basic claim. Contrary to what Davidson says, Maimonides also says that
the “existence of the Active Intellect” is (only) “indicated” and not demonstrated
by the procession of intellects from potentiality to actuality. The causes, or princi-
ples, of the motions of the spheres to which he refers may also be the cosmological
principles he attacks in II:24. Since, as I have indicated, the force of the first proof
in II:1 may also be mitigated by the complications introduced in II:3–4, it is also
difficult to appeal to that argument to unequivocally support a “demonstration” of
“at least one incorporeal mover of the spheres” (“Maimonides on Metaphysical
Knowledge,” 77).
49. It should be noted that Pines’s modifier “separately conceivable” does not
occur in the Arabic (the one [all-purpose] term ma’ani).
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Maimonides’ argument here is two-fold. First, the intellect that moves the
highest sphere cannot be identical with the necessary existent in virtue of
itself because the former is “endowed with two things”: one notion that it
has in common with other intellects and a second that distinguishes it from
them. Hence, although an intellect is not a composite of form and mat-
ter—each is instead a species onto itself—and, strictly speaking, not subject
to individuation, it is a “multiplicity” endowed with element-like notions
that in turn require a cause to explain its unity: the fact that it is one intellect
(II:1:251).50 On the other hand, the necessary existent in virtue of its
essence has no cause; hence, it cannot be identical with any intellect, even
the first. Here the argument, it should be noted, turns on the fact that the
necessary existent is not itself caused, but what is to be explained is the
unity, or oneness, of the intellects despite their multiplicity.
Maimonides’ second point is that “there can be no doubt that all of
[the separate intellects] have one first cause.” Maimonides’ claim is not
only that each separate intellect must have a cause but that there must be
one cause for all the intellects. The argument for this thesis is not the
impossibility of an infinite regress; the reasoning is Avicennean or, if you
will, Neoplatonic. Each separate intellect is one intellect despite the fact
that it is “endowed” with two notions. Therefore each requires a cause to
explain its unity. That cause cannot itself be an intellect for the obvious
reason that any one intellect, being endowed with multiple notions to
distinguish it from other intellects, would require the same explanation
for its unity.51
This, I want to propose, is Maimonides’ argument in step 9 of the B
argument for the existence of the necessary existent in virtue of itself, given
the existence of necessary existents through a cause such as the separate
intellects. The argument is spelled out more explicitly in the last part of
II:1:250–51 where Maimonides explicitly uses it to prove the unity of the
deity. Alluding to I:72 and I:69 where, he says, “it has already been estab-
lished as true by means of a demonstration that all that exists is like one
individual whose parts are bound up with each other” (II:1:250), he first
argues that there must be a cause of the unity of this one individual that
50. On the idea that each separate intellect (as well as star and sphere) belongs
to its own unique species, see Shlomo Pines, “Scholasticism after Thomas Aquinas
and the Teachings of Hasdai Crescas and his Predecessors,” repr. in The Collected
Works of Shlomo Pines, Vol. V (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997), pp. 489–589, 541–52
n. 4–5. I am indebted to Charles Manekin for bringing this reference to my
attention.
51. For a strikingly similar argument, see Al-Kindi’s Metaphysics, trans. A. L. Ivry
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1974), pp. 84, 113, and Michael E. Marmura and John M.
Rist, “Al-Kindi’s Discussion of Divine Existence and Oneness,” Medieval Studies 25
(1963): 338–54, esp. 342–43, 351–54. In their words, “What al-Kindi, in effect, has
attempted to point out is that the plurality which we encounter in the world cannot
be explained unless there is a cause which is essentially one” (354). I am indebted
to Diana Lobel for bringing this parallel argument to my attention.
74 JOSEF STERN
constitutes “all that exists”; and that this cause is the deity.52 Maimonides
next excludes the possibility that there could be numerically more than one
such deity, or more than one divine cause of the unity of all that exists, each
of which would be necessarily existent in itself. He reasons that any multi-
plicity of deities, or beings necessary in themselves, would presuppose yet
another cause to explain their respective unities, which in turn would
contradict the “demonstrated . . . condition that what is necessary of exist-
ence can have no cause” (251). For the same reason, Maimonides excludes
the possibility that the deity, or divine cause of unity, could be a complex
containing internal parts. He concludes:
Thus there can be no doubt about ultimately reaching One who is the
cause of the existence of this existent, which is one, whatever the
manner of this may have been: whether through creating it in time
after it had been nonexistent, or because it proceeds necessarily from
this One [i.e., as in step 9, whether the universe is eternal or origi-
nated]. It has thus become clear . . . that the fact that all that exists is
one, indicates to us that He who caused it to exist is one. (II:1:251)
This argument is also quia, from effects to cause; hence, it is also not a
full-fledged demonstration (propter quid).53 However, the real force of the
argument turns on the characterization of Avicenna’s necessarily existent
being in virtue of itself as (an uncaused being that is) absolutely one,
internally simple, an indivisible unity. As in II:4, this condition excludes the
possibility that the necessary of existence in itself could be an intellect of
any kind—for if it were, it would contain per force two notions whose
coming-together would require a cause. This is the real force of Mai-
monides’ denial in II:4 that the first intellect and necessary of existence are
the same. As in Plotinus, the One is not itself nous or intellect.54 And, as we
52. Maimonides’ use of ‘demonstration’ in this statement, as a glance at I:69
and I:72 shows, cannot be propter quid; indeed in neither chapter is there an
‘argument’ with the explicit form of a demonstration.
53. For further doubts about the argument, see II:22:317ff.
54. Cf. Marmura and Rist, “Al-Kindi’s Discussion,” 345–46. For reasons of
space, I cannot discuss at length Guide I:68, where Maimonides famously discusses
how the deity conceived as an intellect, is simultaneously (and always) intellect,
intellectually cognizing subject, and intellectually cognized object. For many read-
ers, this chapter is evidence that Maimonides holds that God is an intellect. (See
Pines’s own conflicting statements on this issue in his “Translator’s Introduction”
and in “Limitations.”) My own view is that this chapter must be read in conjunction
with I:69–72, in which Maimonides attempts to explain how “these three notions
form in Him . . . one single notion in which there is no multiplicity” (I:68:163)
notwithstanding the apparent multiplicity induced in the deity in virtue of the
knowledge-relation in which He as subject stands to objects of knowledge. That is,
this chapter is concerned with apparent divine internal multiplicity induced by
relations, similar to the syntactic problem of divine attributes discussed in I:50–63.
Maimonides’ reply is that, even if the deity is an intellect ‘related’ to objects of
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argued earlier, insofar as the One as a source of unity lies beyond intellect
and beyond everything we understand about unity, it also lies beyond our
understanding.
Now, I said earlier that the second member of each of the two pairs of
proofs in II:1 picks up the slack left by the other member. If only with a
glance, we are now in a position to see what the fourth metaphysical proof,
from potentiality and actuality, might add to the third proof from possibility
and necessity. The latter proves the existence of the necessarily existent
being in itself insofar as it is the cause of the unity of all that exists. The
fourth argument shows how the necessarily existent in itself is the cause of
the actuality, or being, of all that exists. Maimonides spells the same argu-
ment out in slightly different terms in I:69 where he explains how God is
the formal cause, or form, “for all that exists.”
[J]ust as every existent thing endowed with a form is what it is in virtue
of its form—in fact its being passes away and is abolished when its form
passes away—there subsists the very same relation between the deity
and the totality of the remote principles of existence. For the universe
exists in virtue of the existence of the Creator, and the latter continually
endows it with permanence in virtue of the thing that is spoken of as
overflow. . . . Accordingly if the nonexistence of the creator were sup-
posed, all that exists would likewise be nonexistent; and the essence of
its remote causes, of its ultimate effects, and of that which is between
these, would be abolished. God has therefore, with reference to the
world, the status of a form with regard to a thing possessing a form, in
virtue of which it is that which it is: a thing the true reality and essence
of which are established by that form. Such is the relation of the deity
to the world. In this respect it is said of Him that he is the ultimate form
and the form of forms; that is, He is that upon which the existence and
stability of every form in the world ultimately reposes and by which they
are constituted, just as the things endowed with forms are constituted
by their forms. (I:69:169)
Here God is not a form for a body in the way that material forms are forms
for their respective matter. Instead, God is the form of the world in that,
like more efficient-like Neoplatonic forms that really make that of which
they are forms be those kinds of things, so God, or His being, makes the
universe be: he causes all that exists to exist.55 As Maimonides own language
in this passage testifies, he recognizes that this use of ‘form’ is itself a stretch
knowledge, it is not necessary to claim that He is internally multiple because,
according to the philosophers, even the human intellect is a unity when engaged
in actual intellection. Maimonides is not, however, committing himself in I:68 to the
claim that the deity is an intellect; he is merely arguing that if He were, that would
entail no multiplicity. I intend to elaborate on this chapter elsewhere.
55. For this description of Neoplatonic forms, I am indebted to Ian Mueller
(personal communication).
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of the term—as is his use of ‘actuality’ in the fourth speculation of II:1. But
as we saw earlier, such ‘loose’ use (even) of philosophical language when
we attempt to represent the necessarily existent being in respect of itself is
unavoidable. In any case, together the third and fourth proofs prove, if only
quia, the existence of a necessarily existent being in itself that is the cause
of both the being and unity of all beings.
III
In this concluding section, I return to the question raised at the start of this
paper: What was Maimonides’ purpose in presenting his four speculations
concerning the existence of the deity in chapter II:1? If the four arguments
are not full demonstrations propter quid that furnish the content of proper
knowledge, the caliber of apprehension that would enable a human knower
to achieve union or conjunction with the Active Intellect, what is their
function? If the A half of the third proof is as problematic and circumlocu-
tious as we have suggested, why does Maimonides detour through it? Why
the unnecessary introduction of Premise 26 involving the eternity of the
world if it is not really required for the proof? And if, as we have suggested,
Maimonides is aware of these problems with his proofs—hence, aware that
they do not yield sound explanatory demonstrations of their conclu-
sions—what is he doing in this chapter?
I suggested in section I that demonstrations quia may give grounds
for belief in their conclusions even though they do not yield scientific
knowledge that presupposes understanding. Despite the specific problems
we have now uncovered with the third proof, this may still be true: its
doxastic force is, I think, largely undiminished. Indeed, we might even
buttress the force of the proof if we can explain its oddities in light of
other aims. I now wish to propose that the doctrines purported to be
demonstrated are not, in fact, the primary value Maimonides sees in his
demonstrations. Rather their primary function in the Guide consists in the
“spiritual exercises” in which they engage the inquirer. What I mean by
this last phrase, which I take from the French historian of Hellenistic
philosophy Pierre Hadot, is based on the idea that philosophy is not, or
not primarily, the exposition of an abstract theory or doctrine (or, for that
56. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. A. I. Davidson, trans. M. Chase
(Oxford, 1995), pp. 79–144. It is a further question how, in his historical intellectual
context, Maimonides could have developed this Hellenistic, non-Aristotelian con-
ception of philosophy as a “way of life.” For initial exploration of possible avenues
by which Maimonides might have been led to this view, see the series of recent
papers by Thérèse-Anne Druart, who has tried to argue that such a conception of
philosophy underlies the ethical thought of Al-Kindi and (Abu Bakr) al-Razi: “Al-
Kindi’s Ethics,” Review of Metaphysics 47 (1993): 329–57; “Al-Razi (Rhazes) and
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matter, the exegesis of a text).56 Rather, philosophy is an activity that
constitutes a way of life, albeit one that employs intellectual techniques
such as dialectic and demonstration. To engage in philosophy is to pursue
a set of intellectual practices directed to the achievement of happiness or
perfection, states it seeks to attain by cultivating specific attitudes and
dispositions; by training its practitioners to improve or hone certain of
their skills, capacities, or competences; and by therapeutically treating or
curing the main sources of their unhappiness: their passions and material
impulses more generally. The ‘spiritual’ in this sense includes the cogni-
tive; many philosophical exercises focus on specifically intellectual dispo-
sitions and states they seek to perfect through intellectual activities—such
as research, investigation, techniques of concentration and attention, self-
investigation, and the contemplation of nature through the study of phys-
ics. However, the point of the exercises is not, or not primarily, doctrinal;
it is primarily practical—although the practical here involves intellectual
exercises concerned with theoretical subjectmatter. As Hadot and others
have argued, such a practice-oriented conception of philosophy was held
by all the various Hellenistic schools—each with its own set of exercises
aimed at cultivating its respective set of spiritual attitudes. Maimonides, I
wish to argue, holds a similar view (although, eclectic that he was, it was
also probably not his only view of philosophy).
Maimonides describes exercises of this kind in chapter III:51 where he
reconceives the Mosaic practical commandments as training designed for
the perfected individual to enable him to engage his whole self in divine
Normative Ethics,” in Tradition and Renewal, ed. D. A. Boileau and J. A. Dick
(Leuven, 1993), pp.167–81; “Al-Razi’s Conception of the Soul: Psychological Back-
ground to his Ethics,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996): 245–63; “The Ethics
of al-Razi (865–925?), Medieval Philosophy and Theology 6 (1997): 47–71; and “Philo-
sophical Consolation in Christianity and Islam: Boethius and al-Kindi,” Topoi 19
(2000): 1–10.
Such a view of philosophy may also have arisen under the influence of pietist
(Sufi) views with which Maimonides would have been familiar both through the
writings of Bahya ibn Paquda and from personal acquaintance with Egyptian Jewish
circles of this leaning; see Paul Fenton, Introduction to his trans. with notes of
‘Obadyah b. Abraham b. Moses Maimonides, The Treatise of the Pool (London:
Octagon Press, 1981).
Within the Arabic Aristotelian tradition, there may have been views of philoso-
phy of this more practical type; see T–A. Druart, “Al-Farabi, Ethics, and First Intelligi-
bles,” Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 8 (1997): 403–23. Finally,
for two further recent studies of the Guide that emphasize the role of practices in its
philosophical project (albeit from perspectives different from that developed in this
paper), see Daniel H. Frank, “Reason in Action: The ‘Practicality’ of Maimonides’
Guide,” in Commandment and Community: New Essays in Jewish Legal and Political Philoso-
phy, ed. Daniel H. Frank (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), pp. 69–84 and Frank, “New
Introduction,” in Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, ed. Julius Guttmann, trans.
Chaim Rabin (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1966), pp. viii–xvi; and Menachem Kell-
ner, Maimonides on Human Perfection (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990).
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worship. Earlier in the Guide, chapters III:26–49, he had explained the
commandments as means to communal social, political, and intellectual
welfare, but now their point (for the perfected individual, not for the
community-at-large) is to bring one to occupy oneself solely with
God—which one does by not occupying oneself with anything other than
Him. Through all-absorbing performance of actions that serve no inde-
pendent or external end, the individual “trains [himself] to occupy [him-
self] with God’s commandments rather than with matters pertaining to this
world” (III:51:622).57 Maimonides also presents a number of exercises that
are specifically intellectual elsewhere in the Guide.58 The study of physics
and cosmology is presented as a spiritual exercise that leads one, through
its problem-raising mode of inquiry, to recognition of the limitations of
one’s intellect and thereby to curing, or disabusing, oneself of “epistemic
desires” one cannot satisfy—desires to know things that lie beyond the limits
of human knowledge. Other kinds of metaphysical inquiry lead to antino-
mies that induce a sense of awe in the face of the impossibility of knowledge
of God.59 And I want to suggest that the demonstrations of the existence of
the deity in this chapter also function as exercises, but with yet another aim
or set of aims.
Maimonides’ four demonstrations ascend through a hierarchy of exist-
ence. They begin with and from the sublunar, transient, physical world of
becoming, rise to the eternal, unchanging spheres, then to the incomposite
but not yet absolutely simple separate intellects as movers, and finally to the
one necessary existent in virtue of its own essence—all in pursuit of the
deity. Likewise, there is a clear progression in the series of four demonstra-
tions. The first demonstrates the existence of a first, numerically single
cause of motion. The second demonstrates that this first mover consists in
one notion, even though this unity prima facie falls under the category of
quantity. The third proof shows that the necessary existent in itself exists as
the cause of the unity of all that exists, where its own unity, or oneness, is
beyond all categories. And the fourth proof demonstrates that the neces-
sary existent in itself is the cause of all actuality, the being of all that exists.
Just as the second member of each pair complements the first member, so
57. See my Problems and Parables of Law (Albany, NY: Suny Press, 1998), pp.
45–48, 68–76.
58. As Diana Lobel, “’Silence is Praise to You’: Maimonides on Negative
Theology and Religious Experience,” ms., points out, Maimonides also criticizes
nonphilosophical meditative exercises that do not involve intellectual grasp of their
content. Thus, in III:51, he attacks “someone who thinks of God and frequently
mentions him [yakthuru dhikrahu],” using the Sufi term ‘dhikr’ that refers to prac-
tices of repetition or remembrance (without understanding) of the name of God
that are meant to induce states of ecstasy in God.
59. For examples of these two kinds of intellectually oriented exercises, see,
respectively, “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge” and “Maimonides in the
Skeptical Tradition.”
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the second pair of metaphysical proofs complements, and moves beyond,
the first pair of physical proofs.60
Maimonides’ focus in these demonstrations is on the route they follow
rather than on the destination at which they aim. By engaging in the kind
of intellectual reflection and contemplation required by the demonstra-
tions of the existence of the deity, one worships the deity. As for Plotinus,
Maimonides’ inquiry into divine subjectmatter is not only discourse about
the deity but a kind of intellectual experience directed toward the deity.
Unlike Plotinus, however, Maimonides allows for no ascent beyond the
limitations of the intellect or beyond being, no mystical union or presence
with the deity. Instead the divinely oriented experience arises precisely out
of recognition of, and respect for, the boundaries of the human intellect,
by grappling with the puzzles, antinomies, and obstacles the intellect en-
counters in making the attempt to think about the deity. One makes this
attempt by climbing the ladder of causes, from the intermediate natural
causes of the sublunar world, up to the separate intellects and, finally, up to
the necessary existent, the cause of the intellects’ unity. So, it is crucial for
Maimonides that we not confuse the necessary existent in respect to itself
with the first intellect that moves the highest sphere; but that is not to say
that we can throw away the ladder having climbed as high as we can. For it
is only by way of contemplating the intellects, and in grappling with the
problems and puzzles that inevitably arise in the course of demonstrative
reasoning about these incomposite beings that are yet multiplicities, that we
can approach the subtle understanding of the One that is necessary to be
“guided” to the deity.
Given Maimonides’ strong position on the unknowability of the deity,
a view he expresses through his radical equivocation thesis for all divine
predications, I mentioned earlier that one wonders how he could really
have held we could demonstrate the existence of the deity (even quia)
without running afoul of equivocation. Again, the moral I would draw is
that the function of the proofs is not the thesis they demonstrate but the
discipline they inculcate—by making us recognize the obstacles metaphysi-
cal inquiry encounters. This brings us to a second function of the demon-
strations. The kind of intellectual, or spiritual, experience through which
60. For further examples in the Guide and Mishneh Torah of the pedagogical (if
not epistemic and metaphysical) priority of the physical proof to the metaphysical
proof, see Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment,” pp. 160ff. In the text, it
should be added, I have emphasized the complimentarity of the physical and
metaphysical proofs. A further question is whether (and if so, how) Maimonides, at
perhaps a later stage of his inquiry, exploits the deep tension, or incompatibility,
between the two. At the end of I:72:193, he refers to two demonstrations that prima
facie constitute an antinomy that, in turn, leads him to an expression of awe and
dazzlement before the deity. The two demonstrations to which he refers may be the
physical and metaphysical proofs, already sketched (albeit in somewhat parabolic
form) in I:69 and I:72. For preliminary discussion of this passage, see “Maimonides
in the Skeptical Tradition.”
80 JOSEF STERN
Maimonides guides his reader is not just any such experience; it is meant to
be constrained by the specific character of the arguments and methods of
argumentation he employs.
Maimonides sets up his philosophical demonstrations, in the opening
chapters of Part II of the Guide in deliberate contrast to the proofs of the
Kalam which he lays out in the closing chapters of Part I. His opposition to
the Kalam turns both on their substantive views and, more importantly, on
their methods and style of argumentation; his demonstrations are designed
to condition or train the inquirer to think in certain ways about the deity
that are explicitly opposed to the irresponsible and harmful ways of think-
ing about the deity inculcated by the Kalam. At I:71, the preface to his
discussion of the existence of the deity, Maimonides singles out two main
differences between his and the Mutakallimun’s respective modes of argu-
ment and ways of thinking. First, he emphasizes that his “opinions conform
to that which exists” rather than, like the Kalam, make that which exists
conform to his opinions. For example, he charges that the Mutakallimun
“abolish the nature of all existence” and “violate that which is perceived by
the senses” (I:71:182) simply in order to defend or safeguard the correct-
ness of their opinions. They willingly deny even the evident, and simply
remake reality, to maintain their theological position, reshaping the world
to fit their religious agenda. Maimonides, on the other hand, begins from
what evidently exists, namely, from the premise that “there exists nothing
except God . . . and this existent world and that there is no possible
inference proving His existence . . . except those deriving from this existent
taken as a whole and from its details.” Even for theological purposes, there
is no option but to “consider this existent as it is and to derive premises from
what is perceived of its nature” (I:71:183, my emphasis). It is for this reason
that Maimonides’ demonstrations, unlike those of the Kalam, always begin
from the sensible, physical world and work through the various intermedi-
ate causal principles of nature until we reach the ultimate source. Because
there is no alternate route to knowledge of the deity, Maimonides’ point is
not only to teach us to know God through the sub-lunar world, or nature,
but to train us to conform our metaphysical opinions to what we know,
beginning with the sensible world of nature. For that is, according to our
best available knowledge, what does exist. This may also be Maimonides’
reason for introducing the doctrine of eternity even when it is not really
necessary for his argument: because it is the most reasonable scientific
assumption given the way the world looks to us. The demonstrations not
only aim at knowledge; they aim to cultivate respect for the best knowledge
of what exists, whatever it turns out to be. They lead us to discipline our
thinking about theology, to bring it down to earth by constraining all
speculation to begin on earth, from the facts of sublunar nature as we
perceive it.
Maimonides’ second criticism of the Mutakallimun is that “they follow
the imagination and call it intellect” (I:71:179). His objection is not simply
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that the Kalam employs the imagination (for that may be inevitable, as he
indicates elsewhere, e.g., in III:15), but that they confuse it with the intel-
lect. In other words, what is wrong with the Kalam arguments based on
temporal creation is not they are merely dialectical proofs rather than
demonstrative arguments like those of the philosophers. What is wrong is
that the Kalam does not know that its dialectical arguments are just dialec-
tical and not demonstrative; it mistakenly believes that it has demonstrated
the existence of God. By the same token, Maimonides’ superiority need not
lie in the success of his demonstrations, in the fact that he has soundly
demonstrated the existence of God. Rather, it may lie in the fact that,
knowing the difference between dialectic and demonstration, he knows
that he has not given demonstrative (propter quid) arguments for the deity
(or that what he has given are merely demonstrations quia). The job of the
demonstrations is, accordingly, to train the inquirer to distinguish the
intellect from the imagination (even if one cannot successfully produce an
intellectually sound demonstration), and not to mistake what is truly possi-
ble and necessary with what one merely imagines to be admissible, or with
the familiar, or with what habit would have us believe.
There is another implication of this criticism. Throughout the Guide,
Maimonides identifies the imagination with the vulgar, the way of thinking
of the multitude. By training the inquirer to distinguish the imagination
from the intellect, the demonstrations also serve to teach him that nature
is not itself vulgar, that what is truly natural is not what the vulgar, or the
multitude, imagine to be natural. This leads to a specific recommendation.
In order to conform one’s opinions to what exists, to nature, one must know
what nature is, and for Maimonides that knowledge is to be found exclu-
sively in the study of science. Therefore, one must undertake to study
science or the natural world. How? Maimonides repeatedly tells the reader
that the knowledge that “establishes the correctness of the philosophical
premises that [he] formulates [including the twenty-six premises at the
beginning of Part II]” is not to be found in the Guide itself. “For doing this
constitutes the greater part of the natural and the divine science”
(I:71:182–83). Some of the premises are self-evident, but many of them
refer you to the passages in which their demonstration occurs in the
books concerning natural science or metaphysics. Accordingly, you
should have the intention of looking up the relevant passage and thus
establishing the correctness of what may be required to have its correct-
ness established.
The demonstrations of II:1, in other words, are intended to be read as
summary, abridged versions of extended courses of study in natural science
and metaphysics. ‘Don’t simply take it for granted that my premises are
true,’ Maimonides is telling his readers; ‘investigate them yourselves and
learn the real science.’ Thus, the demonstrations of the Guide call on the
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reader to engage in independent study of physics and natural science in
order to be able to complete their own demonstration. The same demon-
strations that instruct one to conform his opinions to what exists, and
thereby to value the truth, also direct one to discover the truth oneself
rather than complacently accept what others say and to determine what
truly exists as opposed to what merely appears to exist. The demonstrations
of II:1, in short, are nothing less than charges to study physics and meta-
physics.
Maimonides describes the kind of inquiry in which he believes the
demonstrations engage us at the end of I:72. Recall that, as part of his
explication of the parable that man is a small world, he first describes the
relation of the deity to the world as that of an intellect that rules and puts
the spheres into motion, like the human hylic intellect that rules his body.
This is the deity of the physical proofs, the first mover. He next follows this
divine-human analogy with three significant disanalogies, and concludes by
conceding that he really should have compared the deity not to an embod-
ied intellect (either of a human or sphere) but to the human acquired
intellect that is entirely separate from the body, analogous to the necessarily
existent being in virtue of itself. Yet, after further reflection about these
subject matters, about the celestial, separate, and acquired intellects, he
adds that they are all “matters open to speculation and research; that their
“proofs” are “well-hidden though correct”; that “many doubts arise with
regard to them”; and that there always remain criticism and objections. His
order of inquiry, he explains, was therefore to begin with what “exists in
clear form,” a “form” that would be challenged only by someone who is
either “ignorant” or so stubborn that he would rather be self-deceived than
corrected. This individual, who begins from what is clear and
who wishes to engage in true speculation should study until the correct-
ness of everything we have narrated becomes clear to him. He then will
know that this is the form of this permanent existent whose existence
is beyond doubt and dispute. If he wishes to accept this as true from
one to whom all the demonstrations of the demonstrated points are
known, let him accept it in this way and build on it syllogisms and
proofs. If, however, he prefers not to rely on authority—not even with
regard to these first principles—he should study, and in due course of
time it will become clear to him that matters are just as they have been
stated. Lo this, we have searched it, so it is, hear it, and know thou it. (Job 5,
27) (I:72:193–94)
Maimonides does not say that at the end of the day this inquirer will be able
to produce demonstrations propter quid of apodeictic truths. Through study
that “begins with what exists in clear form . . . the correctness of everything
we have narrated [will] become clear to” the inquirer. But “what” Mai-
monides has “narrated” is the fact that the natures of the different intellects
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are “matters open to speculation and research,” that is, matters that are not
to be demonstrated propter quid. Maimonides’ concern instead is to create a
specific type of personality and to cultivate a certain kind of character.
Unlike Eliphaz the Temanite, the speaker of the verse cited, whom Mai-
monides identifies with the “opinion of our Law” (III:23:494) in his inter-
pretation of the Book of Job, Maimonides’ inquirer does not accept truths
merely on authority. He searches until matters become clear to him
through his own efforts. But the clarity and correctness of his speculation
depends as much on the practices in which he engages as on the content
he masters.61
61. See I:71:179.
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